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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial 
Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic University.  
 
The regulation of renewable energy sources and especially renewable electricity has been 
a highly disputed legal issue. Its particularity lies in their cross-cutting nature of renewable 
energy sources, in the sense that they affect a variety of policy areas, such as competition, 
state aid, environmental policy and climate change. The effort of national governments to 
create incentives for the promotion of renewable electricity production has been 
materialized through the development of national support schemes. These schemes come, 
nevertheless, with a number of implications. Not only should these support schemes be in 
compliance with the current market obligations, but also with the EU state aid and free 
movement of goods provisions. The role of the European Commission, as well as that of the 
case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has been vital in providing guiding lines in 
these complex matters. 
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to address three fundamental issues in relation to 
the regulation of renewable electricity at EU level. The first part of the paper presents the 
legal background of both conventional and renewable electricity markets in the EU and 
discusses the ‘bindingness’ of the targets imposed by Directive 2009/28/EC. The second part 
of the paper explores in detail the existing national support schemes for the promotion of 
RES-E and examines their market compatibility. In the last part, the interaction of national 
support schemes with State aid and free movement of goods provisions is analyzed, in both 
cases the starting point being PreussenElektra. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past thirty years, in its effort to tackle environmental and energy security issues, the 
European Union (EU) has demonstrated a growing interest in the integration of energy 
policy into its agenda.1 During the first period of legislative initiatives taken in the energy 
sector, the EU adopted energy measures based on Art. 95 EC (now Art. 114 TFEU) for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. It was the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and 
the introduction of Art. 194 TFEU in particular that established a shared competence 
between the EU and the Member States in the energy sector, and functioned as the legal 
basis for the adoption of secondary legislation for the definition of the common objectives 
regarding the EU energy policy.2 However, the substantial transfer of competences to the 
supranational level was significantly curtailed, since Art. 194(2) TFEU left untouched the 
competence of Member States to determine the choice of energy sources and the structure 
of their energy mix.3 
The particularity of the energy policy lies in its cross-cutting nature, in the sense that it 
affects and is affected by other policy areas, such as competition, State aid, environmental 
policy and climate change. This factor, in combination with the multi-level regulatory 
powers, divided between the EU and the Member States, underline the complexity of the 
energy sector and foreshadow the emergence of controversial legal issues.4 A prominent 
and vivid example of the above constitutes the exploitation of renewable energy sources in 
the electricity sector (RES-E), which is considered to be the most essential environmental-
friendly and benign use of energy.  
                                                     
1 Claire Dupont and Radostina Primova, ‘Combating Complexity: The Integration of Eu Climate and Energy 
Policies’ (2011) 15 European Integration Online Papers 1, 1. 
2 Marc Ringel and Michèle Knodt, ‘The Governance of the European Energy Union: Efficiency, Effectiveness 
and Acceptance of the Winter Package 2016’ (2018) 112 Energy Policy 209, 210. 
3 Frédéric Marty, ‘L' Europe De L' Énergie : De La Concurrence À La Solidarité ?’, 2 <https://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/halshs-01273770> accessed 10 September 2017. 
4 Marjan Peeters and Thomas Schomerus, Renewable Energy Law in the EU – Legal Perspectives on Bottom-
up Approaches (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 3. 
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Legal issues pertaining to renewable energy sources and especially to renewable electricity 
have been the subject of heated legal discourses over time, without always resulting in 
definitive solutions. The efforts of national governments to create incentives for the 
promotion of renewable electricity production is materialized through the development of 
national support schemes, which offer favorable conditions and economic motives to 
renewable electricity producers. This mechanism comes, nevertheless, with a number of 
implications. Not only should these support schemes be in compliance with the current 
market obligations, but also with the EU State aid and free movement of goods provisions. 
The role of the European Commission, mainly with its Communications and Reports, as well 
as that of the case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has been vital in providing 
guiding lines in such complex matters. 
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to address three fundamental issues in relation to 
the regulation of renewable electricity at EU level. The first part of the paper presents the 
legal background of both conventional and renewable electricity markets in the EU and 
discusses the ‘bindingness’ of the targets imposed by Directive 2009/28/EC5. The second 
part of the paper explores in detail the existing national support schemes for the promotion 
of RES-E and examines their market compatibility. In the last part, the interaction of national 
support schemes with State aid and free movement of goods provisions is analyzed, in both 
cases the starting point being PreussenElektra6. 
2. The European Framework of RES-E 
In the first chapter of the paper, three main aspects of renewable electricity will be 
analyzed. First, the regulation of electricity markets in the EU in the past decades will be 
elaborated, in light of their historical background and evolution over time. Second, the 
development of renewable electricity and its penetration into the electricity market, 
especially in light of the RES Directives will be elucidated. Finally, the ‘binding’ nature of the 
                                                     
5 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16.   
6 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2159. 
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Second RES Directive targets and their susceptibility to enforcement mechanisms will be 
investigated. 
2.1 The regulation of electricity markets in the EU 
The development of the European legal framework for RES-E should be read in conjunction 
with the general evolution of electricity markets, since there is an indissoluble connection 
between the two. Taking into account the former prevalence of State monopolies in 
national electricity markets and the fact that traditionally a Member State’s energy policy 
was part of its national competences, the materialization of an internal electricity market 
with common rules has always been a challenge. For this reason, the historical background 
of electricity markets in the EU presents a particular interest and is worth elaborating. 
2.1.1 The first steps towards liberalised electricity markets 
Since the creation of the EU, the first Member State to show the path towards a market 
open to competition was the United Kingdom in the late ‘80s, followed by Norway, Sweden 
and Finland in the ‘90s.7 The interference of the Union and, more specifically, the 
competence of the Commission to legitimately plan for the liberalization of electricity 
markets in the EU became relevant after the CJEU’s ruling in France v Commission.8 The 
Court stated in that case that Art. 90 EC (now Art. 106 TFEU) constituted the legal basis for 
the adoption of legislative measures with regard to the opening of the telecommunication 
markets of the Member States. Taking advantage of both the aforementioned ruling and 
the fact that electricity had already been characterized as a good and not as a service in the 
Costa v ENEL case,9 the Commission took the initiative to go one step further and open the 
electricity markets by launching infringement procedures against Member States that had 
import or export monopolies in the electricity sector.10 These proceedings led to the 
                                                     
7 Tim Maxian Rusche, EU Renewable Electricity Law and Policy: From National Targets to a Common Market 
(Cambridge University Press 2015) 20. 
8 Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223.  
9 Case C-6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 1141. 
10 Rusche 20. 
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adoption of a number of Court rulings,11 which shed some light on the regulatory 
framework. More specifically, the Court stated that “it was certainly not for the Court (…) 
to undertake an assessment, necessarily extending to economic, financial and social 
matters, of the means which a Member State might adopt in order to ensure the supply of 
electricity on the basis of costs that are as low as possible and in a socially responsible 
manner.”12 In light of the above, Member States were armed with a wide discretion in 
imposing import and export monopolies, as long as no relative common rules for the 
internal electricity market existed.13 
2.1.2 The Electricity Directives 
It was not until 1996 and after long negotiations when the first official legal document, 
namely Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity,14 
also known as the First Electricity Directive, was adopted. Its core objective lay in the 
progressive opening of the electricity markets within six years but only to clients with a 
consumption of more than 9GWh of electricity per year.15 The next legislative initiative 
towards a market opening to private householders was taken in 2003 with the adoption of 
Directive 2003/54/EC, the Second Electricity Directive concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity.16 Despite the innovations and significant steps that the 
aforementioned Directives introduced, some structural deficiencies, such as the need for 
the unbundling of integrated companies, hindered the smooth market opening.17 As a 
result, Directive 2009/72/EC, the Third Electricity Directive concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity18 came into force in order to deal with the shortcomings 
                                                     
11 Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477; Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699; Case 
C-158/94 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-5789; Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR I- 5815. 
12 Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, para. 63. 
13 Rusche 21. 
14 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity [1997] OJ L 27/20. 
15 See Art. 19 of the First Electricity Directive. 
16 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity [2003] OJ L 176/37. 
17 Rusche 21. 
18 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity [2009] OJ L 211/55. 
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of the previous Directives. Consequently, national regulation was progressively replaced by 
EU regulation, leading to some substantial changes, such as the extent of governmental 
intervention in the context of an open electricity market.19 
All the above illustrates the challenging path towards the realization of a true internal 
energy market (IEM) in the EU.20 Despite the continuous efforts to create a common 
European legislative and regulatory framework, there are still differences in energy prices, 
in national energy policies and a lack of interconnecting infrastructure between Member 
States.21 The physical interconnection of the markets indeed represents the ultimate stage 
and, at the same time, the most substantial part of the establishment of a properly 
functioning IEM with real competition.22 Even if such a venture hits the wall of political 
dissatisfaction and economic interest, it should still remain the core priority of the European 
Union.23 
2.2. The evolution of RES-E 
The European Union has always stressed the importance of three key challenges in 
reference to planning its energy strategy, namely sustainability, competitiveness and 
security of supply24 and has orchestrated all of its policy tools towards finding a balance 
between the three.25 The production of electricity from RES, which has repeatedly been 
recognized as a high priority, serves to a great extent the abovementioned goals. The 
contribution of RES to the protection of the environment, the increase of electricity 
generation within the EU and consequently the decrease of import dependency, and finally 
the development of cost-efficient and competitive technologies constitutes hard evidence 
                                                     
19 Rusche 22. 
20 Marinos Kanellakis, Georgios Martinopoulos and Theodoros Zachariadis, ‘European Energy Policy—a 
Review’ (2013) 62 Energy Policy 1020, 1025. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Dieter Helm, ‘The European Framework for Energy and Climate Policies’ (2014) 64 Energy Policy 29, 30. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Kanellakis, Martinopoulos and Zachariadis 1021. See also the Commission, ’An Energy Policy for the 
European Union’ (White Paper) COM(95) 682 final. 
25 Karolien Verhaegena and others, ‘Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources — What Target Are 
We Aiming For?’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 5576, 5578. 
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in this regard.26 However, the imposition and implementation of RES-E targets has proved 
to be a long and challenging legislative process. 
2.2.1 The need for RES-E penetration  
The first policy document expressing the Union’s intention to promote the development of 
renewable electricity saw the light in 1986 in the form of a Communication of the 
Commission on the development of new and renewable energy sources27 as a response to 
the environmental concerns of the time in conjunction with the oil crisis. However, no 
specific regulatory measures were foreseen. The 1986 Communication was then followed 
by the Council Recommendation on developing the exploitation of renewable energy 
sources in the Community in 1988,28 which showed the intention of the Community at that 
time to promote the harmonization of regulatory instruments in the renewable electricity 
sector.29 In order for the RES to compete with the rest of the energy sources and for a 
concrete strategy to be adopted, a generally supportive policy framework was clearly 
necessary.30 
However, the interaction between the liberalisation of the electricity market under the First 
Electricity Directive and the penetration of RES had not yet been thought through.31 The 
1996 Green Paper32 mirrored this situation and stated that “as competition on the energy 
market increases, regulatory policy measures have to be replaced by more market oriented 
measures.”33 In this context, taxation of renewables was, for instance, considered as such a 
market oriented measure, whereas subsidy was viewed as a policy measure incompatible 
                                                     
26 Ibid. 
27 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council resolution on a Community orientation to develop new and renewable 
energy sources’ COM(86) 12 final. 
28 Council Recommendation of 9 June 1988 on developing the exploitation of renewable energy sources in the 
Community [1988] OJ L 160/46. 
29 Rusche 25. 
30 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy’ 
COM(97) 599 final. 
31 Rusche 27. 
32 Commission, ‘Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy, Green Paper for a Community Strategy’ 
COM(96) 576 final. 
33 Ibid.  
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with the liberalised electricity market.34 Member States used priority dispatch of renewable 
electricity as the main instrument for the support of RES. Nevertheless, the harmonization 
at EU level and the establishment of a true single electricity market was still a farfetched 
goal. The main concerns and legal discussions were, in principle, related to the several 
support schemes for RES in the Member States, which were expressed in the 1998 
Commission’s Report.35 It was pointed out that, under the First Electricity Directive, any 
support other than the preferential dispatching could be achieved only in two cases, namely 
in the case of public service obligations36 and the transitional support schemes.37 Under 
these circumstances, the existing national support schemes were no longer viewed as 
compatible with State aid rules and the rules on the free movement.38 
2.2.2 EU in action: The adoption of RES Directives 
In light of the above, the First RES Directive39 was issued, having as legal basis not Art. 95 
EC (now 114 TFEU) for the internal market, but Art. 175 EC (now Art. 192 TFEU) for the 
environment instead. The First RES Directive introduced the so-called guarantees of origin, 
which certified the renewable character of electricity, as well as its tradeability.40 With 
regard to national support schemes, Art. 4 of the aforementioned Directive provided an 
important review clause, according to which “the Commission should, not later than 27 
October 2005, present a well-documented report on experience gained with the application 
and coexistence of the different mechanisms”. Following this, the Commission reached the 
conclusion in its Report that the cooperation between Member States and the amelioration 
                                                     
34 Rusche 28. 
35 Commission, ‘Report to the Council and the European Parliament on Harmonization Requirements Directive 
96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity’ COM(1998) 167 final. 
36 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity [1997] OJ L 27/20, Art. 3.  
37 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity [1997] OJ L 27/20, Art. 24.  
38 Rusche 30. 
39 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market [2001] OJ 
L 283/33. 
40 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity [1997] OJ L 27/20, Art. 5. 
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of their national support schemes constituted a more realistic option than their total 
harmonization, given the different stages of development in the sector of renewables in 
each Member State.41 This was also the main reason why no binding targets for renewable 
energy production at national level were imposed on the Member States at that time. 
However, each Member State was required to take the appropriate and proportionate 
action to the objective measures, in order to achieve the national indicative targets in 
accordance with the Directive. 
Later on, and especially in view of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, the 
EU made some serious commitments, namely to reduce 20% of its gas emissions by 2020 in 
comparison to the level of 1990, to guarantee a 20% share of renewable energy in the EU 
energy mix and finally to increase the energy efficiency. This development, in addition to 
the fact that some Member States were far away from achieving the indicative targets set 
by the First RES Directive, made clear that for the period until 2020, a revised Directive with 
binding targets was necessary.42 Practice had indicated until then that two main issues had 
to be resolved: the harmonization of support schemes, and, in the absence of 
harmonization, the cross-border trade, i.e. the possibility of selling renewable electricity in 
a country other than that of production.43 The Commission was yet very reluctant to 
interfere with the national support schemes, since most of them had existed for decades in 
the respective Member States. It chose instead to focus on the guarantee of flexibility in 
terms of cross-border investments, which could be achieved either at the level of individual 
market players or of Member States. In the first scenario, renewable energy producers 
could take advantage of the national support scheme of their preference, whereas in the 
second case, Member States could restrict their support scheme to domestic production 
and block its selling elsewhere.44 
In its effort to stimulate effective cross-border trade, the Commission decided to enhance 
the role of the guarantees of origin, a tool first introduced by the First RES Directive. 
                                                     
41 Rusche 33. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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However, the owner of such a guarantee of origin was not necessarily entitled to receive 
support under any national support scheme. The underlying idea of the Commission’s 
initiative was therefore to enable the trade of those guarantees of origin between market 
participants, while at the same time giving the possibility to the Member States to subject 
their trade to prior authorization.45 This option caused many reactions and political 
oppositions. In view of the above, the text of Directive 2009/28/EC,46 the Second RES 
Directive, introduced three types of flexibility: statistical transfers between Member 
States,47 i.e. the possibility of selling excess production to other Member States, joint 
projects between Member States48 and finally joint support schemes between Member 
States.49 The purpose of these cooperation mechanisms lies in the possibility of fulfilling 
part of a Member State’s target by accessing cheaper RES production in another country.50 
Despite their innovative nature, the aforementioned provisions have been limitedly 
applied.51 
In addition to the above, the Second RES Directive introduced for the first time binding 
national targets for renewable electricity that need to be met by 2020,52 as suggested by 
the Commission. This means that the Commission has the legal possibility to launch 
infringement proceedings against those Member States that will not have met the targets 
set by the Directive, or even ask for the imposition of penalty payments by the CJEU 
pursuant to Art. 260 TFEU.53 However, these measures should be considered as ultima ratio, 
given the fact that the Second RES Directive itself foresees two possibilities of interaction 
                                                     
45 Ibid. 
46 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16.   
47 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16, Art. 6. 
48 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16, Art. 7-10. 
49 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16, Art. 11. 
50 Kanellakis, Martinopoulos and Zachariadis 1022.  
51 For more details see ‘Task 1 Report: Cooperation between EU Member States under the RES Directive’ 
available at <https://www.ecofys.com/files/files/ec-ecofys-tuvienna-2014-cooperation-member-states-res-
directive.pdf>. 
52 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16, Art. 3. 
53 See section 2.3.1. 
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with the Commission: first, Member States have to notify the Commission for their national 
renewable energy action plans,54 on which the Commission may adopt some 
recommendations and point out potential deficiencies; second, the Second RES Directive 
lays down an indicative trajectory for the completion of the mandatory targets. Should a 
Member State fail to abide by this plan, it has to amend its existing renewable action plan 
and the Commission may also issue a recommendation to this regard in order to assure that 
the target will be finally achieved.55 
2.3 Deconstructing the ‘binding’ nature of the Second RES Directive 
targets 
As has already been mentioned, the innovation of the Second RES Directive lies in the fact 
that it imposes binding targets on the Member States, along with the general EU binding 
target for renewables as a share of the overall energy consumption. The reason why these 
targets are considered as important is mainly because they force governments to act and, 
at the same time, they provide incentives for private actors in the field to develop their 
technologies.56 However, little light has been shed on the extent to which these national 
targets are actually binding in terms of their enforceability. This section examines, 
therefore, the current situation and underlines the missed opportunities under the standing 
legislative framework. 
2.3.1 How can enforcement actually be achieved? 
The reasons leading to the adoption of binding targets are relevant when examining their 
enforceability and should be elaborated in order to pinpoint the underlying considerations 
of the European legislator. The growing dependence on oil and gas, putting at risk the 
security of supply, as well as the need to reduce noxious emissions and address climate 
                                                     
54 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16, Art. 4(1) and 4(2). 
55 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16, Art. 4(4). 
56 Angus Johnston and Eva van der Marel, ‘How Binding Are the EU's 'Binding' Renewables Targets?’ (2016) 18 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 176. 
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change were the starting points for a more aggressive policy in the field.57 Against this 
backdrop, the Commission, despite the contrary past opinion of the Council and the 
Member States, outlined the necessity to adopt binding targets for a 20% share of RES in 
overall EU energy consumption by 2020. After extended negotiations, especially regarding 
the national targets, the binding targets became a reality in early 2008. 
The first crucial issue pertains to the point in time when the binding targets can be subject 
to enforcement. In the case of renewables, enforcement can only take place after the set 
period has passed and the relative target has not been achieved.58 Taking into account the 
importance that renewable energy sources deploy – in the current discourse concerning the 
EU’s overall environmental and climate change policy – all necessary measures, ensuring 
the achievement of the targets should take place during and not after the crucial period set 
in the Second RES Directive. It is therefore obvious that the susceptibility of the binding 
targets to enforcement is indissolubly connected to the true influence and effectiveness of 
the overall EU energy policy. 
In view of the above, the question that arises is: What mechanisms does the Directive set 
in motion in order to ensure that the binding targets are met? The first point of reference 
relates to the ‘effectively designed measures’ (EDMs) of Art. 3(2) of the aforementioned 
Directive. In spite of the fact that they constitute the primary tool for achieving the national 
targets, there is no definition in the Directive clarifying the term. This choice can be 
explained on grounds of proportionality and subsidiarity concerns, so that the Member 
States can preserve some flexibility. However, the task of the Commission to evaluate which 
national measure is indeed ‘effectively designed’ becomes a very complicated one.59 
Considering the similarities that this wording presents with the Birds Directive,60 and the 
interpretation followed in this case by the Court regarding the limits of discretion of the 
                                                     
57 See Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’ COM(95) 682 final. 
58 Johnston and van der Marel 177. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Under the Birds Directive 79/209/EC, Member States are required to designate ‘the most suitable 
territories’ for the conservation of certain bird species and to take ‘special conservation measures’ to ensure 
their survival and distribution (Article 4(1) and (2)). 
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Member States,61 it can be argued that the EDMs are specific measures, creating binding 
obligations, which are subject to judicial enforcement.62 Experience so far suggests, 
however, that the evolution of RES has been a challenging and long process.63 Thus, EDMs 
are still under development and seem to be far from offering a real enforcement prospect 
in terms of final goals.64 
A further mechanism available alongside the final binding targets is the national indicative 
trajectories (Part B, Annex I of the Second RES Directive). As the term implies, if a Member 
State falls short of its indicative target, it is not in breach of an obligation under the 
Directive. However, in such a case it is obliged to change its current National Renewable 
Energy Action Plan (NREAP) and resubmit it to the Commission (Art. 4(4)). Failure to do so 
could trigger an enforcement action by the Commission, but it cannot go beyond that and 
indicate a better NREAP to the recalcitrant Member State.65 Although, admittedly, the 
Second RES Directive provides for more means of monitoring and putting pressure on 
Member States in comparison to other EU legislative measures,66 the possible reach of 
enforcement is rather limited, particularly in cases where a Member State fails continuously 
to meet its indicative trajectory. 
2.3.2 Missed opportunities under the Second RES Directive 
At this point, it is worth elucidating the missed opportunities under the Second RES 
Directive. First of all, the total absence of any penalties in case the Member States fail to 
meet the binding targets puts the creditability of those targets in question and raises 
concerns about their success. Furthermore, the existence of a portfolio of renewables 
technologies in the Directive itself could be of great assistance to the Member States in 
ensuring the achievement of their binding targets.67 The EU is reluctant to proceed with 
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such an endeavour on grounds of subsidiarity concerns, despite the fact that the wording 
of Art. 194(2) TFEU is far from clear in defining the extent of potential intrusiveness of the 
EU secondary legislation.68 
In conclusion, the overall analysis suggests that the Second RES Directive includes, in effect, 
a set of unenforceable obligations behind the façade of mandatory compliance.69 
Nevertheless, the diverse mechanisms established by the Directive, such as the EDMS, 
NREAPs and the indicative trajectories, have created different types of governance and have 
thus led to a more flexible notion of ‘bindingness’.70 In this context, it should also be taken 
into account that the threat of legal action by the Commission pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU is 
a rather weak one, especially in the area of environmental and energy policy.71 In virtue of 
the above, the achievement of the national binding targets lies at the end in the discretion 
and the level of commitment of the Member States. The Commission itself recognized in its 
recent report that ‘Member States will have to continue their efforts to reach their 2020 
binding targets, as the trajectory becomes steeper’.72 Could the aforementioned concerns 
be the reason why in its proposal for a revised Renewable Energy Directive, the Commission 
focuses only on the binding targets at EU level and abandons any respective binding 
national targets?73 We can only assume so. 
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3. National Support Schemes in Res-E  
After the introduction of the ambitious goals with the Second RES Directive, it became 
apparent that these targets could only be met if significant investments in new renewable 
projects took place. The combination of increased cost of renewable technologies on the 
one hand and the high market risk with no secured returns on the other, underlined the 
necessity of additional political support in this endeavour.74 The RES-E is of particular 
interest, given that it has the longest and richest history in terms of national support 
schemes. This chapter deals with two central issues. The first one relates to the most 
popular national support schemes that have been developed over the past decades. 
Second, it will be investigated whether the design of those support schemes is still 
compatible with the current market rules or whether it should be revisited. 
3.1 Existing national support schemes 
As far as the development of RES-E support policies is concerned, there are, in general, two 
prevailing approaches in the EU. The first one is a fully harmonised support system, in which 
a ‘top-down’ policy is adopted and implemented in the same way in all Member States.75 
This model was proposed by the Commission to be adopted in the Second RES Directive in 
the form of a pan-European quota obligation scheme with tradeable green certificates. In a 
‘tradeable certificates’ model, all utilities are obliged to generate a certain percentage of 
electricity from renewable resources.76 They can either generate that electricity themselves 
or purchase ‘green certificates’ from those who have used renewables to generate 
electricity. However, after the opposite opinion of the Parliament and the Council, this 
model was not included in the Directive.77 The second approach is the ‘bottom-up’ policy, 
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according to which each Member State is independent to choose the policy of its preference 
by planning its own NREAP. This constitutes the current model in the EU, in which the 
Commission has monitoring and assessing tools at its disposal.78 
3.1.1 The major national support schemes in the EU 
In the context of the ‘bottom-up’ approach, the default option for promoting renewable 
electricity in markets is, in most cases, the feed-in tariff (FIT).79 The main characteristics of 
this price-driven model consist in the priority dispatch to generation and guaranteed prices 
either for a specific period, or for a predefined percentage of electricity production.80 The 
first countries to implement FIT schemes were France (1955), Spain (1980), Portugal and 
Sweden (1988), Germany (1990), Luxembourg and Greece (1994), mostly in the form of 
‘avoided costs’ or ‘percentage of retail price’.81 The particularity of the FIT lies in the fact 
that the producers of RES are exempted from market participation, in the sense that they 
deliver the produced power to an obliged off-taker, normally the transmission (TSO) or 
distribution system operator (DSO), and receive the guaranteed price. Electricity consumers 
usually bear these costs in the form of public service obligation charges. On the contrary, in 
the slightly different scheme of feed-in premiums (FIP), renewable electricity producers 
receive a premium per unit as a fixed add-on to the price, in which they sell their product 
on the free market.82 
Another mechanism used for the promotion of renewables are tenders (TND). Here, calls 
for tender take place for specific amounts of capacity and the winning bidder receives a 
guaranteed tariff for a specific time period. It therefore constitutes a quantity-driven tool.83 
It is often the case that tenders are combined with other policy types, altering in that way 
the characteristics of authority planning and investor risks.84 As far as financial support is 
                                                     
78 See section 2.3. 
79 Rusche 63. 
80 Kitzing, Mitchell and Morthorst 194. 
81 Rusche 63. 
82 See also Toby Couture and Yves Gagnon, ‘An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models: Implications 
for Renewable Energy Investment’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 955. 
83 Wind Energy - The Facts, https://www.wind-energy-the-facts.org/introduction--types-of-res-e-support-
mechanisms.html accessed March 2009. 
84 Kitzing, Mitchell and Morthorst 195. 
   
  -16- 
concerned, it can either be investment-focused, meaning that the winning bidders receive 
upfront investment grants, or generation-focused, in the sense that support is provided as 
a ‘bid price’ per kWh for a guaranteed duration.85 This model has been applied, for example 
in France for the promotion of wind power.86 
Finally, quota obligations with tradable green certificates (TGCs) constitute the last major 
national support scheme, which functions also as a quantity-driven instrument. This 
mechanism imposes an obligation either on producers or on suppliers of energy to include 
a specific share of renewables in their portfolio.87 The certificates issued during this process 
represent this quantity that derives from renewables and are therefore used as proof of 
compliance with the relevant quota obligation, when such a proof is requested by the 
relevant authorities. These certificates are then freely traded in the market, carrying a 
specific market price. Hence, for RES-E producers, financial support arises from trading the 
aforementioned certificates, in addition to the revenues that they receive from selling 
electricity on the power market.88 The Member States that have chosen this model over 
time are either distinguished as pioneers in market opening or dominated by liberal ideas.89 
3.1.2 The supplementary support policies 
The abovementioned major national support policies can be further enriched by certain 
supplementary support tools. Investment grants constitute a very popular form of 
additional financial support, granted by both national and European institutions to investors 
in the sector of renewables. The payment of the grant usually concerns the construction 
phase of the planned project, although it is accompanied by specific conditions, such as 
successful completion and connection to the grid.90 Apart from such grants, fiscal measures 
also constitute a suitable instrument of support. They can take the form of income tax 
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reliefs, reduced value added tax in certain technologies, or electricity tax reliefs in countries 
where electricity generators are subject to electricity taxes.91 Finally, financing support 
depicts a last category of supplementary tools in the financing sector92 and has been a 
regulatory subject of Regulation 1828/2006 of the European Commission.93 The aim of 
those measures lies in the facilitation of investors of renewables to access the market on 
fair and attractive terms and thereby create incentives for more investments.94 
All in all, despite the fact that the dialogue about full European harmonisation in 
juxtaposition with the strengthening of national support schemes is still ongoing, the rapid 
evolution of national support policies is already a reality. Every Member State has 
implemented one of the major support schemes, i.e. the feed-in tariff, feed-in premiums, 
tenders or quota obligations with tradable green certificates. In many cases, they are 
accompanied by supplementary tools, such as investment grants, fiscal measures and 
financing support instruments. The existing landscape suggests that in the course of the 
past decades, national support schemes have significantly matured, since they have been 
adjusted to the particularities of each Member State.95 The experience gained so far 
undoubtedly belongs to the powerful assets for future steps in this regard.    
3.2 Questions around the market compatibility of national support 
schemes  
It is clear from the analysis conducted so far, that the development of RES-E has been 
heavily based on out-of-market support policies, whose main aim lies in the limitation of 
investor risks.96 Despite the omnipresence and effectiveness of these policies, their 
structural design has occasionally led to market distortions. It is questionable whether the 
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isolation of RES-E from market price risk and the preferential treatment of this sector is still 
justified under the standing market and competition rules, especially when taking into 
account the maturity of RES-E investors.97 In its guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection and energy, the European Commission calls for a “minimum level of market 
responsiveness” in RES-E support mechanisms to enhance market integration and reduce 
such distortions.98 For this reason, it is worth examining the current structural design of the 
aforementioned national support schemes and detect the elements that should be subject 
to future alterations. 
When analysing the design of the national support mechanisms, there are three 
determinant aspects to take into account: the degree of technical and operational 
integration, the determination of the total support needed and finally, the format of the 
perceived remuneration.99 As far as the technical standards are concerned, RES-E have been 
exempted from a number of requirements, in order to make their interconnection easier 
and are instead subject to special obligations.100 With regard to the support needed, the 
two major approaches, i.e. price-based and quantity-based schemes, create competitive 
pressure resulting in technological advancement. However, small-scale projects usually face 
great difficulties coping with such competition and are thus discouraged from entering the 
RES-E sector.101 Finally, in respect to the third point, the incentive expected by the 
renewable producers is based on operational decisions influenced either by the 
characteristics of the power plant or by other market factors.102 
The issue of market compatibility of national support schemes is relevant when discussing 
the structure of the format of the perceived remuneration, which can be either production-
based or capacity-based. Production-based remuneration schemes are distinguished by 
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regular payments based on the generator's actual production, creating in that way an 
incentive to maximize energy production. Payments are made regardless of the demand for 
the electricity price and marginal costs. Feed-in tariffs constitute a classic example of this 
out-of-market approach.103 Feed-in premiums and green certificates,104 although tied to a 
certain extent to the energy market, also lead to market distortions, given that RES-E 
generators have the incentive to produce, even when market prices fall below their 
marginal cost, and thus distort the price signal for other market participants.105 On the other 
hand, capacity-based mechanisms are intended to cover the difference between a power 
plant's upfront investment cost and the present value of any expected market revenues 
after subtracting the operating costs.106 In general, these types of support mechanisms are 
considered to be the most market-compatible option, since they distinguish between 
payment and performance, and therefore avoid creating misleading market signals. 
In light of the above, it is clear that so far, national support policies have been heavily 
concerned with creating sufficient incentives for RES-E producers in order to increase 
investments in this sector. Eliminating investment risks and establishing price certainty are 
consequently set as top priorities. However, the experience of the past decades suggests 
that increased penetration of RES has also led to an increased maturity of investors. Against 
this backdrop, there is growing consensus that the ‘special treatment’ of RES-E should be 
put to an end. The penetration of RES-E in energy markets should be accompanied by 
market compatible support schemes that would create the same risks and incentives as 
conventional energy generators. Well-designed capacity-based mechanisms, instead of 
production-based ones seem to present a realistic option towards a full RES-E market 
integration.   
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4. The threshold of State aid and free movement of goods provisions 
The design and development of national support schemes constitutes only one piece of the 
puzzle towards the promotion of renewable energy sources. Their interaction with 
fundamental EU Treaty provisions and especially with those relating to State aid and the 
free movement of goods has repeatedly been the subject of court decisions and legal 
debates. In order to highlight the most burning issues, this chapter will first deal with crucial 
State aid considerations and second with the implications in the area of free movement of 
goods, as depicted by the evolution of EU case law in this field. 
4.1 State aid considerations  
Since the underlying idea of national support schemes lies in the promotion and 
encouragement of investments in RES-E, it is unsurprising that in some cases they may entail 
the granting of State aid in the sense of Art. 107(1) TFEU. The lines between State and 
private aid can be very thin. This is why the criteria laid down in Art. 107(1) TFEU must be 
cautiously applied under the guidance provided by the CJEU in the PreussenElektra107 case. 
Against this background, this part of the paper addresses three topics. First, the exact 
meaning of ‘State resources’ in the context of national support schemes is made clear. 
Second, it is investigated, whether the Altmark108 criteria are relevant when examining 
national support schemes for RES-E. Third, the compatibility of State aid for renewable 
energy with EU the internal market in view of the 2014 Guidelines on State aid for 
Environmental Protection is elaborated. 
4.1.1 The case of PreussenElektra as a milestone 
During the first period of RES-E penetration in the 1990s, the Commission started to receive 
notifications of national support schemes for renewable energy from the Member States, 
the first ones being the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, under 
Art. 93(3) EC (now Art. 108(3) TFEU). The national support schemes of that time were mainly 
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long-term electricity contracts as a result of public tenders, feed-in tariffs or trade green 
certificates.109 In most cases, the Commission considered those support schemes to 
constitute State aid, without paying any particular attention to the criterion of ‘State 
resources’, but in the end, they were authorized as compatible with EU law (EC law at the 
time) on grounds of Art. 92(3)(c) EC (now Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU). 
The turning point was the German PreussenElektra case, dealing with provisions of the 
Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, the 1990 German law on feeding electricity from renewable 
energy sources into the public grid. This law created an obligatory grid off-take for 
renewable energy producers at a guaranteed price, which was above the market price for 
electricity.110 According to the Commission, the law was compatible with the energy policy 
aims of the Communities and given that electricity markets were still non-liberalised, their 
size was too small to have any repercussions on electricity prices.111 Germany then 
amended the law in 1998 and introduced a renewable energy cost-sharing scheme for 
allocating the arising extra costs between electricity supply undertakings and electricity 
network operators, without submitting a State aid notification to the Commission. 
No sooner had the amended legislation been adopted, when PreussenElektra, an electricity 
network operator, refused to reimburse Schleswag, a local energy supplier.112 
PreussenElektra challenged the validity of the provision, relying on the direct effect of State 
aid rules, and in particular of Art. 93 (3) EC (now Art. 108 (3) TFEU). Consequently, the 
regional court of Kiel made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ (now CJEU), asking 
inter alia about the compatibility of the law with the Treaty provisions. In its ruling, the 
Court found that although an economic advantage was indeed conferred, the provision in 
question did not involve any State resources at all.113 It argued that the allocation of the 
financial burden arising from the advantage in question was one ‘between private electricity 
supply undertakings and other private undertakings without involving any direct or indirect 
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transfer of State resources’,114 and thus concluded that the case at issue did not amount to 
an infringement of State aid provisions. It is worth mentioning that the Court left the 
question open as to whether the same reasoning would be applicable in the case of publicly 
owned electricity undertakings. 
4.1.2 Drawing the line between private and State resources 
In the aftermath of PreussenElektra, the academic literature was torn in two. On the one 
hand, many heavily criticised the decision of the Court, arguing that the distortions in 
competition caused by the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz could no longer be dealt with. On the 
other hand, others welcomed the limits set out by the Court on the powers exercised by 
the Commission.115 The main concern remained, however, the extent to which the ruling 
would be applicable. Would, from then on, all forms of regulation promoting renewable 
electricity escape the scrutiny of the State aid test? 
4.1.2.1 Imposition of a levy 
The Commission was the first actor to deal with the remaining uncertainties on the occasion 
of its decisions on State aid notifications. In many cases, the support schemes imposed a 
levy on end consumers, which had to be paid to a private or public body in order to 
compensate the DSO or the TSO for their additional costs. The difference between those 
schemes and PreussenElektra is that in the latter case, DSO and TSO are not mandated by 
the State to administer the support mechanism in place, nor are they compensated by a 
private or public body for their extra costs. It was soon made clear that in the case of these 
support schemes the dividing line for the Commission was not the imposition of the levy by 
the State, but whether it was collected by a private or a public body.116 In the Commission’s 
view, a system designating a private body to accumulate the levy did not amount to State 
aid. In cases, however, where the scheme under examination involved payments by public 
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undertakings, the Commission abandoned the PreussenElektra reasoning and considered 
them as State aid measures.117 
4.1.2.2 Tradable green certificate schemes 
In addition to the above, the approach of the Commission with regard to tradable green 
certificate schemes (TGC),118 occasioned by a Danish notification,119 is of particular interest. 
Under this support policy, RES-E producers, apart from selling the power produced, also 
received green certificates, which were traded in a separate market. End consumers were 
then obliged to purchase part of them depending on their consumption, otherwise they 
were imposed a fine. The State would use the amount collected by the fines to buy the 
corresponding green certificates.120 Since it was before PreussenElektra, the Commission 
took the view that the imposition of such a purchase obligation by the State through law 
was enough to consider this measure financed by State resources and thus as State aid. 
The Commission’s approach took however another direction after PreussenElektra, which 
became apparent when it had to deal with the British121 and Belgian122 TGC schemes. In its 
reasoning, which was identical in both cases, the Commission examined three issues in 
order to conclude whether there were State resources at stake. First, it analyzed the 
obligation imposed by the State on electricity suppliers to purchase a specific number of 
certificates, and came to the conclusion that it was comparable to the obligation imposed 
in PreussenElektra to purchase renewable electricity at minimum prices. No State resources 
were therefore used in this regard. Second, the Commission found that the fact that the 
State provided RES-E producers with green certificates, i.e. intangible assets, for free, 
constituted a mere proof that renewable energy was indeed produced and did not involve 
State resources. Finally, it investigated whether the redistribution of the money gathered 
by the abovementioned fines constituted State aid. Due to the different way in which the 
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money was distributed in the two schemes – in the UK it was given to RES-E producers, 
whereas in Belgium it was used by a separate entity to finance other projects – the 
Commission reached the conclusion that the British scheme constituted State aid, while in 
contrast the Belgium scheme did not.123 
The landscape was once again blurred after the Netherlands v Commission124 case. Here, 
the Court of First Instance stated that the fact that certificates allowed undertakings to 
avoid paying fines, resulted in the reduction of State revenues and thus constituted State 
aid.125 After the adoption of this decision, the Commission faced great difficulties in taking 
a definitive position, which was mirrored in its decision on a notification received by 
Romania,126 concerning a TGC scheme for renewable electricity. The Commission developed 
its arguments in length, without taking a firm position on whether State resources were at 
stake in the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU and finally approved the measure as compatible 
with the internal market pursuant to Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU. In its most recent decision on 
Polish certificates,127 the Commission finally took a clear stance, arguing that ‘by granting 
certificates of origin for free to the RES-electricity producers while setting up a quota for 
obligated parties/creating a demand for those certificates, the State forgoes State 
resources’,128 but then approved the scheme on the basis of Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU. It seems, 
therefore that the Polish decision constitutes a landmark decision, which lays down the 
bedrocks for similar cases in the future. 
4.1.3 Going beyond PreussenElektra 
It results from the above that the situation regarding State resources in national support 
schemes needed further clarification. More specifically, the exact limits of PreussenElektra 
were far from clear and the Commission had difficulties in drawing the line by itself. It was 
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not until the adoption of Essent129 and Vent de colère130 cases that the Court set down some 
guidelines and shed more light on the matter. 
In 2008, the Court delivered its judgment in Essent, adopting a restrictive interpretation of 
PreussenElektra. In this Dutch support scheme, the national legislation permitted the levy 
of a surcharge on the price for electricity transmission in favour of a statutorily designated 
company, which was required to pay stranded costs.131 Advocate General Mengozzi 
recommended to the Court not to extend the applicability of PreussenElektra to this case, 
pinpointing specifically two particularities: first, both undertakings involved in 
PreussenElektra were privately owned and second, the support mechanism did not 
designate any intermediary acting as administrator or collector of the respective sums.132 
Consequently, the AG concluded that PreussenElektra did not concern cases in which the 
subsidy is financed by imposing charges on public undertakings, or cases in which the sums 
meant to finance the subsidy – although imposed on private undertakings – are 
administrated by intermediaries.133 The Court followed the restrictive approach of the AG 
and considered the Dutch support mechanism to have used State resources in the sense of 
Art. 107 TFEU. 
Six years after Essent, the CJEU received a preliminary reference by the French Conseil d’ 
État, which focused on the meaning of State aid and specifically of the intervention granted 
by the State or through State resources in the sense of Art. 107(1) TFEU. In the Vent de 
colère case, the issue in question concerned the French wind feed-in tariff support system 
and particularly the obligation to purchase the renewable electricity at a price higher than 
the market one.134 Network distributors were then compensated for the additional costs by 
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a public entity, which in turn received the respective amount from the end consumers. The 
French government based its arguments on the PreussenElektra reasoning, claiming that 
the two cases were comparable and should therefore lead to the same result. 
The Court, following the opinion of the Advocate General took, however, a different view. 
It made clear that ‘the concept of ‘intervention through State resources’ is intended to cover, 
in addition to advantages granted directly by the State, those granted through a public or 
private body appointed or established by that State to administer the aid’.135 The decisive 
factor was therefore the fact that the sums paid by the end consumers were collected and 
administered by a public entity, which was also designated to do so by the State.136 On the 
contrary, in PreussenElektra not only were there private undertakings involved, but also 
they had not been appointed by the State to manage any resources. As a result, the Court 
denied the applicability of PreussenElektra and considered the support scheme in question 
to fall within the scope of Art. 107(1) TFEU. 
4.1.4 Putting the pieces together 
It is obvious from the above that the interaction between national support schemes for 
renewable electricity and State aid provisions has not been a straightforward one. Taking 
into account the case law to date, it is possible to distinguish between four situations for 
which the legal analysis has been clarified, and two situations for which uncertainties still 
exist. Against this backdrop, the following cases are considered as clarified: first, purchase 
obligations for private undertakings with no compensation through levy for additional costs 
(PreussenElektra) do not qualify as State resources; second, purchase obligations for public 
undertakings with no compensation through levy for additional costs amount to 
intervention of State resources; third, purchase obligations for private undertakings with 
compensation through levy paid through an intermediary designated by the State fall within 
the scope of 107(1) TFEU; finally, purchase obligations for public undertakings with 
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compensation through levy paid by consumers to a public undertaking (Vent de colère) 
involve the use of State resources. As far as green certificates are concerned, the recent 
decisions of the Commission in the Romanian and Polish cases seem to lay down a 
precedent and gradually set aside any uncertainties about this area. Finally, the legal 
assessment in cases in which purchase obligations are imposed on undertakings where the 
minority of the shares are still publicly owned, has not yet been clarified neither by the 
Commission nor by the Court.137 
4.1.5 The relevance of the Altmark criteria  
At this point, it is worth examining whether the aforementioned national support schemes 
should be regarded as public service obligations (PSO) in accordance with the Altmark 
criteria and thus not constitute State aid, even if State resources are used. The fact that the 
Commission finally approves national schemes on the basis of 107(3)(c) TFEU, does not 
preclude the relevance of the Altmark criteria, since the framework for PSOs establishes 
more favourable conditions for the Member States.138 More specifically, the Court stated in 
Altmark that the compensation of an undertaking for a PSO does not constitute State aid if 
the following criteria are accumulatively fulfilled: the undertaking must indeed have a PSO 
to discharge, which must be defined in a clear manner; second, the calculation criteria of 
the costs have to be established beforehand in an objective and transparent way; third, the 
compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the incurred costs; fourth, if the 
selection of the undertaking to carry out the PSO is not a result of a public tendering 
procedure, the compensation level has to be determined on the basis of the costs that a 
well-run and adequately resourced company would have to bear.139 
The Commission examined the applicability of the aforementioned criteria only in 
compensation schemes for electricity produced by indigenous energy sources. It argued 
that in areas where EU rules exist on PSOs, Member States are bound by their definitions 
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provided in EU legislation and lose their discretion in determining what might qualify as a 
PSO.140 As far as electricity is concerned, the Commission’s view is that Member States are 
limited to the PSOs listed in Art. 3 of the Third Electricity Directive. However, the Court 
underlined in Federutility141 that Art. 3 of the Directive ‘lays down only minimal common 
rules as regards public service obligations and that the requirements concerning the public 
service must be capable of being interpreted, subject to the observance of the law of the 
Union, ‘on a national basis’, and ‘taking into account national circumstances’.142 
In view of the above, the academic discourse has been significantly enriched with 
arguments in favour of considering the national support schemes for renewable energy 
sources in electricity as PSOs. Although the assessment of the Altmark criteria is more 
difficult in FiT and TGC, because these schemes may fail to fulfil the fourth criterion, since 
they apply to all installations regardless of their efficiency,143 it is highly relevant in public 
tender schemes.  
4.1.6 The EU Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy 2014-2020144 
In cases in which the Commission found that a national support scheme constituted State 
aid in the sense of Art. 107(1) TFEU, it examined the potential compatibility of the State aid 
with the internal market under Art. 107(3) TFEU. In this context, the Commission’s 2014 
Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy (hereafter 2014 
Environmental Guidelines) play a crucial role in this legal assessment and simultaneously 
aim at the achievement of the binding targets set by the Second RES Directive. While the 
previous Guidelines of the Commission left the discretion of Member States in designing 
their support schemes untouched, the 2014 Environmental Guidelines orchestrate the 
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Commission’s State aid power to force Member States into adopting only ‘market-based’ 
support mechanisms.145 
Indeed, the Commission has taken an aggressive approach in this respect and invites all 
Member States to switch, as of 2017, their support policies either to tradable green 
certificates or feed-in premiums, the beneficiaries of which will be selected by a public 
tender, in other words quantity-based mechanisms.146 This automatically means that the 
bell tolls for the feed-in tariff schemes, which are no longer viewed as a market compatible 
support policy.147 It remains to be seen how far the Commission will go in enforcing the text 
of the 2014 Environmental Guidelines. It could be argued that in view of the large market 
share of RES-E, the distortions of competition caused by the national support instruments 
are so serious that the authorization of the national measure can no longer be possible 
under Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU.148 
From a legal point of view, the Commission’s approach is de lege lata fraught with legal risk. 
It is highly questionable whether the Commission can interfere and limit in that way the 
discretion of the Member States to choose which support policy to implement,149 especially 
given that the Second RES Directive explicitly gives them such authority. It should be born 
in mind, however, that the incompatibility of the existing national support schemes with 
the market obligations has already been subject of the academic discourse, as pointed out 
above in section 2.2.  
4.2 National support schemes versus free movement of goods 
The interaction of national support schemes with State aid rules is only one side of the coin. 
Under the Second RES Directive, Member States are at liberty to adopt support schemes for 
the promotion of RES-E while excluding RES-E produced in a different Member State from 
their scope of application. Consequently, their compatibility with the principle of free 
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movement of goods incorporated in Art. 34 TFEU and the justification grounds brought 
forward by the Member States, invoking environmental protection reasons has been at the 
center both of the case law and the legal literature. The CJEU’s rulings and in particular 
Ålands Vindkraft150 and Essent Belgium151 are of high importance in this respect. The first 
seeds for discussion were already planted in PreussenElektra, in which the Court stated that 
taking into account the EU RES law at that time, the restriction of trade in electricity 
inherent to the geographical limitation of national support schemes can be justified for 
reasons of environmental protection.152 In light of the above, the two aforementioned cases 
will be elaborated and the main major legal issues will be analysed in depth. 
4.2.1 Brief presentation of the two landmark cases 
In Ålands Vindkraft, the Court had to rule on the compatibility of the Swedish law on green 
electricity certificates, which were awarded only to green electricity production 
installations located in Sweden.153 The Swedish national support scheme was developed 
under the Second RES Directive. This case is of particular interest because of the completely 
opposing viewpoints adopted by the Advocate General and the Court respectively. Although 
they both found the Swedish legislation to constitute a measure having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports, AG Bot pointed out that in view of the developments 
in the electricity sector, and in particular the liberalisation of the electricity market and the 
implementation of a system for the mutual recognition of guarantees of origin, the 
justification grounds and the relative proportionality test should be revisited.154 Against this 
background, he found the Swedish law disproportionate to the aim pursued and thus not 
justifiable based on environmental protection reasons. In addition, the AG went one step 
further and recommended that the CJEU should declare that Article 3(3)(2) of Second RES 
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Directive, which confers on Member States the power to prohibit, or to restrict, access to 
their support schemes for producers whose installations are located in other Member 
States, is contrary to Article 34 TFEU, and, consequently, invalid.155 The Court took, 
however, a different view at this point and found the restrictive Swedish measures to be 
justified based on environmental protection grounds and also proportionate to the aim 
pursued. 
Following Ålands Vindkraft, the Court’s judgement on Essent Belgium was delivered only 
two months later, in September 2014. Here, the provisions of the Flemish Decree on the 
organization of the electricity market required energy suppliers connected to the grid to 
demonstrate the use of a certain amount of renewable energy, on pain of a heavy 
penalty.156 However, only locally produced green energy was eligible for such a proof of 
compliance, excluding in that way green energy produced in another Member State. Since 
it was again AG Bot delivering his opinion in this judgment on a preliminary reference, he 
invited the Court once again to abandon its approach regarding the justification of 
restrictions based on environmental protection grounds, arguing that the consumption of 
green electricity produced outside of the Flemish region would contribute equally to a 
reduction of greenhouse gases within the Flemish region.157 The Court basically repeated 
its considerations developed in Ålands Vindkraft and found the Flemish law to be justified, 
proportionate and compatible with the free movement of goods provisions. 
4.2.2 The role of environmental protection and proportionality in cases 
concerning national support schemes  
The Court orchestrated its rulings relying heavily on the provisions of the Second RES 
Directive and took into consideration also the underlying rationales when weighing the 
conflicting values, namely the free movement of goods and the protection of the 
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environment.158 It constantly fails, nevertheless to directly address their compatibility with 
Art. 34 TFEU, despite the concerns expressed by the AG. The Court continues to consider 
the discriminatory national support schemes as measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports and to examine then whether they are justifiable and 
proportionate.  
4.2.2.1 Environmental protection as a justification ground 
Both in the Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium cases, the national support schemes offer 
additional benefits only to domestic renewable energy producers, establishing thus a 
regulatory framework where foreign producers are not placed on equal footing with 
domestic ones. Although these schemes constitute direct discrimination against foreign 
goods, the CJEU interestingly avoided such terminology and stated instead that they ‘hinder 
(or impede) electricity imports from other Member States’.159 Such a manoeuvre enabled it 
to find recourse to the category of overriding requirements, in order to justify the restrictive 
measures on grounds of environmental protection. In the annotated cases, the CJEU 
continues to tread on thin ice argumentatively, showing little concern for consistency.160 
More specifically, the protection of the environment constitutes a fundamental justification 
ground falling under the ambit of the overriding requirements, which were developed as 
such in the Cassis De Dijon161 case. According to the Cassis De Dijon formula, environmental 
protection can be invoked as justification ground only in measures indistinctly applicable to 
domestic and imported products alike. Nevertheless, the CJEU has complicated things and 
has developed a rather inconsistent case law, without ever directly addressing the question 
whether the application of environmental protection grounds and overriding requirements 
in general can be extended also to distinctly applicable national measures.162 Indeed, the 
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CJEU accepted in both cases the justification of the restrictive national measures on the 
basis of environmental protection reasons in conjunction with public interest grounds 
relating to the health and life of humans, animals and plants, stipulated in Art. 36 TFEU. 
After consideration of the relevant EU case law, it seems that the CJEU implicitly recognizes 
overriding requirements relating to the protection of the environment as an admissible 
exception to the aforementioned rule, i.e. as a ground which can be invoked to justify even 
import restrictions which are directly discriminatory.163 
Certainly, there are a number of reasons why environmental protection should constitute 
the justification ground even for distinctly applicable measures. First, since the initial 
formulation of Art. 36 TFEU, the umbrella of legally protected interests has not been 
widened, despite the developments indicating otherwise. In the past decades, combat 
against climate change and environmental protection have been set as top priorities in the 
EU policy and possess a leading role in the EU agenda. It is highly doubtful, therefore, 
whether the environment should enjoy a weaker standard of protection than the interests 
recognized many decades ago and taken over into the text of Art. 36 TFEU. In the end, the 
arguments against loosening the ban on discriminatory measures are not persuasive. The 
appropriateness of the national measures will be further examined under the 
proportionality test. A clear and direct answer by the Court therefore remains necessary in 
order to clarify once and for all the landscape on the matter. 
4.2.2.2 How is the proportionality test applied when environmental 
protection is invoked for the justification of discriminatory national 
measures? 
The principle of proportionality constitutes a cornerstone in balancing different legal 
interests and is thus a valuable legal instrument available at the hands of the CJEU.164 In 
Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium, the Court went to great lengths to examine whether 
a territorial limitation which is an inherent feature of the national support schemes for 
renewable electricity is appropriate for attaining the respective legitimate objective and 
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necessary for those purposes.165 In both cases, the national schemes survived the 
proportionality test and were finally found to be compatible with the free movement of 
goods. 
What remains rather unclear is the level of rigorousness, with which the proportionality test 
will be applied. Advocate General Bot underlined the necessity that discriminatory national 
measures should ‘undergo a particularly rigorous proportionality test’,166 without clarifying 
what a rigorous proportionality test should be like in such cases, i.e. in cases concerning 
environmental protection and free movement of goods. In its settled case law, the Court 
has, in general, applied the proportionality test very cautiously and strictly.167 However, 
both in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium it applied it in a soft manner and found that 
the discriminatory measures were both appropriate and necessary to attain the objective 
attained, without investigating any alternatives able to achieve the same objective in a less 
restrictive manner.168 
Taking into account that the objective pursued in these cases lies in the promotion of 
renewable energy, the exclusion of foreign green producers from national support schemes 
can hardly contribute to the achievement of this aim. When affirming the justification of 
the national measures, the Court merely repeated the provisions of the RES Directive and 
underlined the wide discretion conferred upon Member States in drafting their energy 
policy. It seems, therefore that the Court chose to respect the EU legislator and 
consequently the political decisions in this sector.169 Against this background, the 
effectiveness of national support schemes for RES-E prevails over the establishment of a 
fully integrated and undistorted internal market in renewable electricity.170 
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4.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has elucidated the interaction of national support schemes with two 
fundamental EU Treaty provisions, namely Art. 107(1) and 34 TFEU. The starting point in 
both scenarios is PreussenElektra, a landmark decision which laid down the building blocks 
for the evolution of the schemes for renewable energy sources. In this context, the 
approach both of the Commission and the CJEU is of particular interest, especially after the 
liberalization of the electricity markets and the progressive penetration of RES in the 
market. 
As far as the financing of national support schemes from State resources is concerned, it 
has proved to be a complex matter which has agonised the EU institutions. At first, 
notifications of Member States of their national measures were approved by the 
Commission, without any major concerns. Nevertheless, after PreussenElektra, the 
distinction between State and private resources became a central issue, on which no clear 
answer was provided. Gradually, the Court, on a case-by-case basis, attached particular 
importance to the legal form of the involved undertakings and the degree of intervention 
of the State, clarifying thus the situation to a certain extent. In addition, the relevance of 
the Altmark criteria for the characterization of some schemes as PSOs has gained a lot of 
ground in the academic discourse. Finally, the 2014 Environmental Guidelines will play a 
crucial role in qualifying national measures as State aid, given the ‘soft’ obligation they have 
imposed ever since 2017 on Member States to make their national support schemes 
market-based, i.e. compatible with market obligations and therefore responsive to price 
signals.171 
In addition to the above, the structure of national support schemes is in many cases in 
contrast with the principle of free movement of goods. Member States often pose territorial 
limitations as a prerequisite for the granting of financial assistance in green electricity. 
Again, at the time of PreussenElektra, the evolution of Community law allowed such 
discriminatory measures in order to promote the penetration of RES. However, taking into 
account the intent of the Commission to gradually harmonize national support schemes at 
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EU level with the aid of soft law measures, such as the 2014 Environmental Guidelines and 
its individual decisions on State aid notifications, it is highly doubtful that such territorial 
limitations are henceforward justified.172 Against this background, the Court’s rulings, such 
as those in Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium underline the necessity for a new EU legal 
document, which will put in effect the decisions made on the political level and replace the 
Second RES Directive. 
5. Outlook – Looking back but thinking ahead 
The conducted analysis has indicated in an illustrative way the complexity of the legal issues 
pertaining to the renewable electricity sector. Taking into consideration the shared 
competence between the EU and the Member States in regulating energy policy, a multi-
level governance has been established in the post-Lisbon era, in which the tension between 
the EU’s intention to reach a single energy market and the Member States’ sovereignty over 
their energy policies in view of Art. 194(2) TFEU is apparent. The legislation and CJEU case 
law suggest that the drafting of the overall energy policy is left at the hands of the EU, 
whereas its materialization basically constitutes a task of the Member States. This division 
of regulatory powers is reflected in Directive 2009/28/EC, which sets binding targets on 
Member States as a share of the overall energy consumption from renewables, while 
leaving wide discretion to the Member States to choose the appropriate national support 
scheme for the promotion of renewable electricity. 
The plurality of national support schemes, varying from feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums 
and tenders to tradable green certificates casts doubt on whether a true single energy 
market can be achieved. The benefits of harmonization of support schemes are underlined 
by many scholars,173 but a number of obstacles have still to be overcome. The fact that 
national support schemes are massively approved by the Commission on the basis of Art. 
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107(3)(c) TFEU and, at a next level, that territorial limitations are repeatedly justified by the 
CJEU on environmental protection grounds, indicate that to date Member States are far 
from being forced to implement far-reaching adjustments and reforms of their domestic 
schemes.174 
The arising question is therefore: How long until the creation of a single energy market? The 
Commission’s Winter Package 2016175 provides some hints for the future steps towards the 
realisation of a common EU energy market, provided that it will successfully go through the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Even though the harmonization of support policies is still not 
set as an objective, a new governance model is foreseen from 2021 onwards.176 In this 
context, the target of at least 27% for the share of renewable energy consumption by 2030 
is binding only upon the EU and not the Member States at national level.177 The Member 
States will be, however, obliged to draft integrated energy and climate plans, in which they 
analyse their present and future actions on all topics covered by the “Energy Union”.178 It is 
noteworthy that even in this enhanced model, the Commission lacks substantive powers to 
exercise control over the process and progress of the Member States, meaning that 
compliance with the EU-wide target depends more or less on the goodwill of the latter.179 
There are, however, two proposed regulatory measures that are of particular interest. First, 
retroactive policy measures on support schemes for renewables will be forbidden.180 This 
means that cuts or changes which affect existing support schemes and thus crash investors’ 
trust will no longer be an option. Second, national support schemes must be market-
oriented and, from 2021, open to cross-border participation.181 The underlying idea is that 
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joint support schemes help Member States to achieve the Union target more cost-
efficiently. The implementation details are, nevertheless, left to the Member States, which 
have to ensure ‘compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, including Articles 30, 34 and 110’.182 The aforementioned measures 
indicate in their essence a repatriation of responsibilities to the national level. 
In conclusion, the achievement of a single energy market in the EU has proved to be a 
deeply challenging and complex matter. Despite the large number of regulatory documents, 
there is still a long way to go. The gap resulting from Art. 194(2) TFEU, which preserves 
significant powers to Member States to regulate their energy mix and the general structure 
of their energy supply is hardly filled by the proposed measures. Against this background, 
harmonization of national support schemes seems to be a controversial political issue and 
a far-fetched plan. This explains the rather soft approach of the CJEU in its case law dealing 
with discriminatory support schemes and free movement of goods. In any case, some seeds 
towards the establishment of a common rulebook on national support schemes have been 
sporadically planted, especially in light of the Commission’s 2014 Environmental Guidelines 
and 2016 Winter Package. Whether their fruits can be reaped in the near future remains to 
be seen.  
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